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 Media Censorship and Stock Price: Evidence from the Foreign 
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Abstract 
 
This paper studies the price implication of media censorship in the context of the long-
standing foreign share discount puzzle in China. We conjecture that the government censors 
negative news and promotes positive news in Chinese media, leading to the premium on A-
shares, which are mainly traded by domestic investors. We find that the ratio of positive to 
negative news is substantially higher for Chinese newspapers than English newspapers. Such 
favouritism is found to inflate the price of domestic A-shares and contribute to the discount of 
foreign B-shares from the same firms. We also provide evidence that B-share investors pay 
more attention to bad news, while A-share investors pay more attention to good news. Our 
findings suggest that the news perception distorted by media censorship helps to explain the 
foreign share discount puzzle and has important implications for international capital flows. 
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1. Introduction  
 
The media plays a key role in the financial market (Barber and Odean, 2008; Fang and 
Peress, 2009; Engelberg and Parsons, 2011; Tetlock, 2008, 2014). Media outlets such as 
newspapers generate and disseminate financial information to a broad audience in a timely 
manner (Zingales, 2000; Soltes, 2010). The media can also play an active governance role 
when direct monitoring is ineffective or costly (Dyck and Zingales, 2002). However, the 
ownership structure and freedom of the media could potentially prevent it from playing 
effective information dissemination and monitoring roles in the financial market. Using 
media ownership data of 97 countries, Djankov et al. (2003) find that greater government 
ownership is associated with lower press freedom, poorer governance and less developed 
stock markets. Their results are consistent with the public choice theory that incumbent 
politicians could distort and/or manipulate information to entrench themselves, reduce the 
dissemination of information and consequently impair markets, if the media is largely 
government-owned (Sen, 2001; Besley and Burgess, 2002). 
 
Although prior studies suggest that politicians have incentives to censor negative 
information, and press freedom could influence the development of financial markets 
(Djankov et al., 2003), how such media censorship affects stock price remains unanswered. 
More importantly, in the context of cross-border investments, what is the impact of such 
media censorship on foreign investments in stock markets (e.g. investments in cross-listed 
firms)? The answers to these pertinent questions have important implications for asset 
pricing, international capital flows and foreign investments. In this paper, we empirically 
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examine the effect of media censorship on stock price in the setting of the foreign share 
discount in China.
1
 
 
China provides a unique opportunity to study this issue for three important reasons. First, the 
Council on Foreign Relations notes that the Chinese government has long kept tight reins on 
the media. The France-based watchdog group Reporters Without Borders ranked China 176 
out of 180 countries in its 2016 worldwide index of press freedom. China has the highest 
level of state ownership of newspapers (Djankov et al., 2003; Kim et al., 2014) and the lowest 
level of press freedom (Kim et al., 2014).
2
 Such an extreme media environment enables us to 
more easily observe the impact of media censorship on stock price. Second, the Chinese 
government has the incentive and ability to suppress unfavourable news in traditional and 
internet media. On the one hand, local governments incur a reputation cost when firms in 
their regions report poor performance, because negative information shows weakness and 
results in a “loss of face” for local politicians. On the other hand, traditional media channels 
(i.e. newspapers) are controlled by the government and party organizations through direct 
ownership, licensing and financial support (see Section 2.1 for a comprehensive discussion). 
The internet and social media are actively regulated and monitored, and both channels are 
subject to censorship (Stockmann, 2013).
3
 Finally, some Chinese firms have dual classes of 
                                                        
1 Cumming et al. (2016) test whether the difference in media coverage in the Chinese and English business press 
for the same firm is associated with the foreign share discount, using a sample of cross-listed firms between 
2004 and 2008. They find that the discount is greater for firms with more coverage in the Chinese business press 
than English business press, and the effect is more salient among firms with lower analyst following and less 
institutional ownership. Our study is different from Cumming et al. (2016) in two important ways: first, we 
focus on the disparity of tone of news reported by Chinese and English newspapers (instead of the difference in 
number of news stories), and how it contributes to the magnitude of foreign share discount; second, we find that 
the divergence in tone between Chinese and English newspapers plays a more significant role in explaining the 
foreign share discount for firms with a better information environment (i.e. firms with more analyst following). 
This implies that news coverage and tone influence stock price, possibly through different channels. 
2 Kim et al. (2014) construct a press freedom proxy based on press freedom indices and some other data items 
provided by Freedom House and Reports without Borders. 
3
 Since 1997, more than sixty internet regulations have been enacted by the Chinese government and 
implemented by provincial branches of state-owned internet service providers and commercial organizations. At 
least 18,000 websites are blocked from mainland China, including 12 of the Top 100 Global Websites, including 
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common stock for domestic and foreign investors, respectively. As domestic and foreign 
investors are exposed to different media environments (e.g. different degrees of media 
censorship), they may trade differently the two classes of shares, which carry identical cash 
flow rights. The different media exposure makes it possible for us to meaningfully compare 
stock pricing when there is a high degree of media censorship with stock pricing when there 
is little or no media censorship. Presumably, media censorship could be one possible 
explanation for the price gap between the dual classes of shares (i.e. the foreign share 
discount). Furthermore, the identical nature of both classes of shares allows us to conduct a 
relatively clean test of the net effect of media censorship on stock price. The foreign share 
discount puzzle in China is explained in detail in the following section.  
 
In the early 1990s, China established two separate classes of stocks, one for Chinese 
domestic investors (A-shares) and another for foreign investors (B-shares).
4
 Firms can issue 
both types of shares on domestic stock exchanges, but foreign (domestic) investors could only 
trade B-shares (A-shares) until 2001. B-shares have always been traded at a discount relative 
to A-shares, even since 2011, when Chinese domestic investors with foreign currency deposit 
accounts began to be allowed to invest in B-shares.
5
 As Figure 1 shows, the average A-B 
share discount remains around 50%.
6
 The puzzle still exists after the factors which were 
found to drive the discount in the literature have been substantially improved. These factors 
include the quality of corporate governance, illiquidity, difference in risk aversion and 
                                                                                                                                                                             
Google (The Economist, April 2013). This greatly impairs the ability of local Chinese investors in China to 
access information from the websites of foreign newspapers. 
 
4 Chinese firms can also issue H shares on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, but before November 2014 domestic 
investors were not allowed to directly invest in the Hong Kong market. Since November 17, 2014, Mainland and 
Hong Kong investors can directly invest in the Shanghai and Hong Kong markets through the “Pilot Program of 
an Interconnection Mechanism for Transactions in the Shanghai and Hong Kong Stock Markets”. In this study 
we focus on the price difference between A-shares and B-shares. 
5 As the holding of foreign currency is subject to strict exchange control in China, B-shares are still largely held 
by foreign investors (Tan, 2011; Hou and Lee, 2014). 
6 The drops in 2001 and 2006 were attributed to the reduced information asymmetry (Chan et al., 2008) and Split 
Share Structure Reform (Hou and Lee, 2014). 
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differential demand elasticity (Bailey, 1994; Brennan and Cao, 1997; Fernald and Rogers, 
2002; Chan et al., 2008; Mei et al., 2009; Tong and Yu, 2012). In addition, some prior studies 
(e.g. Chakravarty et al., 1998) argue that foreign investors have an information disadvantage 
due to language barriers and the difference between domestic and international accounting 
practices. Consequently, foreign investors require a higher rate of return to compensate for 
the high information risk, leading to B-shares being priced at a discount. Although the foreign 
share discount is a widely studied puzzle in the literature, the evidence on why the puzzle 
originates and persists is far from conclusive. This study intends to provide a new explanation 
of the puzzle based on the media censorship in China.  
 
The role of the media as an information channel in the financial market has been 
studied extensively. However, the impact of an important institutional feature, media 
censorship, on stock price has received limited attention. Although the Chinese government 
has gradually relaxed its tight control over domestic and international information flow in 
order to facilitate its economic reform since 1978, in the absence of laws that protect the 
freedom of the press in China, the government still has an overwhelming influence on the 
media. For example, commercial newspapers remain state-owned, and newspapers must have 
sponsorship from a government unit in order to obtain a license. Furthermore, the government 
continues to control major newspapers by maintaining ultimate power to appoint or dismiss 
senior editorial staff. These mechanisms ensure that the reporting policies and editorial 
practice of newspapers are aligned with the objectives of the government. Therefore, Chinese 
newspapers, which are considered to be under tight government control, serve the 
government’s political agenda.  
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A major consequence of the state ownership and control in the Chinese media is that 
negative news tends to be censored, because the government has a strong incentive to 
suppress the release of bad news to maintain social and economic stability (Piotroski, Wong 
and Zhang, 2015). For example, some news websites are regulated such that negative news 
(including business news) accounts for no more than 30% of all news.
7
 Some previous studies 
(Chakravarty et al., 1998; Cumming et al., 2016) suggest that the tight control over the 
Chinese media has a significant influence over security pricing in China. The media control 
not only applies to sensitive political news but also to business news, to some extent. There 
are particularly strong incentives for the Chinese government to exert control over news 
related to firms with B-shares, since all of these firms were carefully selected by the 
government and they are the most important players in their respective industries. In fact, 
most of them were so-called “state-owned key enterprises” before going public (Chen et al., 
2001). The performance of these firms could have a significant impact on economic growth 
and social stability (e.g. employment). As a result, the tightly controlled Chinese media tends 
to paint a rosy picture of these firms compared with its English counterpart. In contrast, the 
English media is not likely to suppress negative news about Chinese firms. The relatively 
more negative tone in the English media may lead B-share investors to trade down the B-
share price of cross-listed firms, thus resulting in a larger foreign share discount. In addition, 
the great divergence between the tone of news reports in Chinese and English media implies 
more information uncertainty for cross-listed firms; therefore, B-share investors will demand 
a return premium for their investment. Thus, we predict that a greater divergence in the tone 
of news reports, as reflected by a high ratio of good to bad news reported in Chinese and 
English media, is associated with a larger A-B share discount for cross-listed firms, ceteris 
paribus. 
                                                        
7 See http://www.cnhubei.com/xwzt/2011/wmwz/gzjy/201207/t2133513.shtml (in Chinese) 
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To perform our analysis, we collect news from mainstream Chinese and English 
newspapers and conduct an experiment in which participants are asked to read news related to 
public firms and categorise it as “good”, “bad” or “neutral”, based on their perception. Then 
we analyse whether the divergence of favouritism of news between Chinese and English 
media could explain the A-B share discount. The empirical analysis confirms our prediction. 
First, we find that the Chinese media, in general, is more positive about firms with dual 
classes of shares than the English media, and we report evidence that a foreign share discount 
could result from such a higher level of favouritism in Chinese news relative to English news. 
In particular, our results show that the foreign share discount is significantly greater among 
firms with a larger number of Chinese good news reports, all else being equal. This is 
consistent with A-share prices being higher when more favourable news is reported by 
Chinese newspapers, leading to a larger difference between A-share and B-share prices. 
Second, we find that the foreign share discount is greatest when both the number of Chinese 
good news reports and the number of English bad news reports are higher. As more Chinese 
good news could result in an increase in A-share price, and more English bad news could 
result in a decrease in B-share price, all else being equal, the foreign share discount could be 
greatest when both effects work concurrently. Third, we report a significantly positive 
correlation both between the number of English bad news reports and B-share investors’ 
attention, and between the number of Chinese good news reports and A-share investors’ 
attention, using the Google search volume index (SVI) of a listed firm as the proxy for 
investors’ attention. This finding confirms that investors do pay attention to news, which is 
the important condition on which our argument hinges. Finally, we find that the positive 
association between the level of foreign share discount and the divergence in the ratio of good 
to bad news between Chinese news and English news is more pronounced in firms with a 
high level of analyst following. Given that firms disclosing more information usually have a 
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higher level of analyst following (e.g. Lang and Lundholm, 1996), we could expect that the 
media has a stronger influence on these firms’ share prices, as news about these firms could 
attract more attention from investors due to the improved information environment. These 
findings are robust to controlling for other determinants of foreign share discount and region, 
industry, and firm and year fixed effects.   
 
Our study contributes to two important streams of the literature. We add to the 
growing literature on media ownership and control (e.g. Djankov et al., 2003; Houston et al., 
2011; Gehlbach and Sonin, 2014) and extend the focus from corporate governance to price 
implication. We provide evidence that media censorship significantly affects stock price, and 
a lack of press freedom has important implications for the capital market and foreign stock 
investments. Media censorship also has an unfavourable impact on capital allocation 
decisions among foreign (B-share) investors. To the best of our knowledge, we are the first to 
document the undesired economic consequence of a lack of press freedom in the context of 
foreign investments. Second, we shed light on the long-lasting foreign share discount puzzle 
in China (Chan et al., 2008; Fernald and Rogers, 2002) by providing empirical evidence of 
how news perception is manipulated by media censorship, thus offering a new explanation of 
the puzzle.  
 
The reminder of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 provides the institutional 
background and reviews the literature. Section 3 explains our approach to quantifying the 
tone of the news in this paper. Section 4 describes the sample selection process and presents 
the descriptive statistics. Section 5 discusses the results of our main specifications for the 
impact of media favouritism on the A-B share discount. Section 6 presents additional 
analyses and robustness tests. The last section concludes. 
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2. Institutional background and the literature 
 
2.1 Newspapers in China 
 
 
The Chinese media has long been seen as the “mouthpiece” of the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) and a propaganda tool under the Central Propaganda Ministry. 
During the period of 1949-1976, all news media in China was either directly funded by the 
government or indirectly funded by the government through forced subscriptions. The state’s 
ultimate ownership of news media enabled the CCP to control the media effectively (Yue and 
Gong, 1997). As many studies on news media show, when newspapers are controlled by an 
authoritarian government, the government’s incentive to achieve political goals and the lack 
of competition from independent news sources could result in biased news reporting (Tullock, 
1987). In China, the tight control of the news media enables the government to employ it as a 
tool to generate positive propaganda while suppressing negative news.   
 
From the late 1970s to the late 1990s, the Chinese media went through a period of 
liberalisation, as China’s economic reform transformed economic and social structures. 
However, most non-Party publications arising from such liberalisation were absorbed into 
Party-sponsored publications during the 2003 media reform orchestrated by the Chinese 
government to consolidate existing newspapers into commercialised news groups based on 
locality (Qinglian, 2004). In general, the Chinese government has managed to continue to 
effectively control the news media and introduce an upward bias (i.e. more positive news) in 
news reporting with the intention of furthering its political agenda through various 
mechanisms. First, all newspapers must be registered under state or party organisations and 
are subordinated to a local sponsoring government unit. This mechanism worked even more 
effectively after the 2003 reforms, as the consolidation process created several large media 
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conglomerates, making central control of the media even easier (Hassid, 2008). In this sense, 
the conglomeration largely facilitates the central government’s monitoring of the tone of the 
news media. Second, senior editorial staff members and top managers of most major 
newspapers are appointed directly by the Central Publicity Department (CPD) or the local 
propaganda departments of the government (Esarey, 2005). To secure their posts or seek 
promotion, top managers have strong incentives to encourage the production of positive news 
and filter out negative news. Third, journalists’ compensation packages are designed in such a 
way that bonuses are directly linked to the number of articles they publish. Therefore, “there 
is a strong monetary incentive to toe the party line in order to ensure publication” (Hassid, 
2008). In other words, journalists are induced to be risk-averse and are likely to produce more 
positive news than negative news in order to maximise their monetary compensation.  
 
In brief, all these institutional, structural and monetary mechanisms allow the Chinese 
government to continue to exert tight control over the news media, even after a series of 
media reforms. It has been well documented that government-controlled media could distort 
information and provide upward biased views to entrench incumbent politicians, while 
independent media could supply relatively accurate news and unbiased views to the public 
(e.g., Djankov et al., 2003; Besley and Prat, 2006). Therefore, the tightly controlled Chinese 
news media is expected to generate more positive news than its independent foreign 
counterparts. In other words, the tone of Chinese news media is expected to be relatively 
more positive than English news media. Such upward bias embedded in Chinese news could 
also affect investors’ processing of relevant information, and consequently have an influence 
on investors’ valuation of stocks.
8
 Therefore, it is pertinent to explore the effect of the 
divergence of tone between Chinese and English media on the prices of A- and B-shares. 
                                                        
8 Hong et al. (2005) develop a model where agents use over-simplified/partial information to value stock while 
ignoring the true, more complex fundamental information, resulting in either overvaluation or undervaluation. 
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2.2 Setting of the Foreign Share Discount in China 
 
 
Since the early 1990s, China’s two stock exchanges in Shanghai and Shenzhen have 
experienced remarkable growth, but the Chinese stock market is still dominated by 
unsophisticated retail investors. Firms that issue A-shares could also issue B-shares in the 
domestic market, and B-shares are traded in Hong Kong dollars (US dollars) in Shenzhen 
(Shanghai). Since February 2001, mainland Chinese investors have been allowed to invest in 
B-class shares; foreign investors, however, are still subject to restrictions in investing in A-
shares. Compared with A-shares, B-shares are always traded at a discount (Bailey, 1994; 
Fernald and Rogers, 2002). A number of studies provide theoretical and empirical 
explanation of the A-B share discount. For example, Bailey (1994) attributes the discount to 
the low expected return for domestic investors, because they have limited investment 
alternatives. Amihud and Mendelson (1986) propose that illiquid stocks usually have a higher 
expected return to compensate investors for the illiquidity risk. Because A-shares have been 
much more liquid than B-shares, B-shares are priced at a discount to compensate for the 
illiquidity risk. Another explanation of the puzzle is that there is information asymmetry 
between domestic and foreign investors. Chan, Menkveld and Yang (2008) use proprietary 
trading data to test the information asymmetry hypothesis for the A-B share discount puzzle. 
They use the market microstructure model to construct information asymmetry measures, and 
find such measures can explain a significant amount of cross-sectional variation in the A-B 
                                                                                                                                                                             
For example, investors of A-shares might make persistent forecast errors while neglecting pertinent information 
signals (i.e. negative news due to media censorship), leading to a lower expected rate of return for their 
investment and therefore an overvaluation (which is reflected by the higher A-share price). Furthermore, Barber 
et al. (2009) indicate that individual investors’ trading has a significant systematic component, suggesting that 
the biases of individual investors do not cancel out in aggregate. This may help to justify the persistence of the 
A-B share price difference. 
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share discount. A recent study by Tong and Yu (2012) offers a corporate governance 
explanation for the A-B share discount. The authors find that the A-B share discount is larger 
for firms with weaker governance, characterised by higher ownership concentration by 
controlling shareholders, less effective boards and lower dividend payout. They conclude that, 
compared with domestic investors, B-share investors care more about the quality of corporate 
governance and therefore demand a return premium for firms with inefficient governance. 
 
On 19
th
 February 2001, the China Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC) and the 
State Foreign Exchange Administration Bureau (SAFE) announced that starting from 28
th
 
February 2001, domestic investors who have foreign currency deposit accounts in domestic 
banks could also invest in B-shares. Before the opening up of the B-share market to local 
investors, the average A-B share discount was 72% (Tong and Yu, 2012). Although the 
discount decreased after 2001, it continues to exist and has actually widened in recent years. 
Mei et al. (2009) run empirical tests based on the theoretical model developed by Scheinkman 
and Xiong (2003), and they show that the price premium of A-shares persists after 2001 
because there are too many speculative traders who are concerned with short-term trading 
profit in the A-share market. Therefore, they argue that such a premium could be partially 
induced by the speculative trading behaviour. Their findings echo the conclusion in a formal 
report issued by the OECD, which states that “share prices (in China) are not well-connected 
with corporate results. The market has been marred by speculation and market manipulation” 
(OECD, 2001). To summarise, evidence on the origin and persistence of the A-B share 
discount remains inconclusive.  
 
2.3 Media coverage and stock prices 
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There is a growing body of literature supporting the idea that the media plays a crucial 
role in asset pricing, as the media helps distribute information to a large audience. For 
example, Fang and Peress (2009) report that stocks with no newspaper coverage earn 
significantly higher future returns than those that are heavily covered, after controlling for 
size, market-to-book ratio, momentum and liquidity. They conclude that media coverage 
facilitates information diffusion, provides credible information to a broad audience and 
therefore enables the firm to be better recognised by investors, indicating that investors 
require lower returns. Engelberg and Parson (2011) analyse the earnings announcements of 
S&P 500 index firms, and they find that local media coverage has a strong impact on local 
trading in various US cities. Using a national newspaper strike as an exogenous event to 
investigate the causal link between media coverage and stock market behaviour, Peress 
(2014) reports that the trading volumes, the dispersion of stock returns and intraday volatility 
decrease significantly on strike days. The findings suggest that the media improves the 
efficiency of stock markets through facilitating the dissemination of information among 
investors. 
 
Another strand of literature focuses on the tone of media coverage. For example, 
Dougal et al. (2012) show that the identity (i.e. “bullishness” or “bearishness”) of the 
columnists of Wall Street Journal reliably predicts next-day returns on the Dow Jones 
Industry Average. Their results suggest that the trading behaviours of investors could be 
heavily influenced by the bullish or bearish sentiment conveyed by columnists. Researchers 
also explore the role of media optimism/pessimism in financial markets. For example, 
Tetlock (2007) reports that pessimism in media has strong predictive power for downward 
pressure on stock prices, and Tetlock et al. (2008) further show that the amount of negative 
words in news stories also forecasts earnings performance. Carey et al. (2016) also show that 
the tone of news significantly affects first-day pricing of IPOs in Australia. Regarding the 
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economic consequence of press freedom, using an international setting, Kim et al. (2014) find 
that a lack of press freedom is associated with the reduced ability of stock price to incorporate 
firm-specific information and predict future earnings. 
 
3. News perception 
 
This section describes the perception-based method used in classifying news in our 
study. A brief review of the existing methods used in the finance literature is given before 
introducing the rationale and the details of our method.  
 
3.1 Existing methods and drawbacks 
  
There are several widely used methods of distinguishing good news from bad in the 
finance literature. One of the most popular methods is to compare the observed disclosure 
with investors’ expectations and classify news as good (bad) when the observed value is 
higher (lower) than the expected value. This method is utilised in studies on earnings 
announcements (Patell and Wolfson, 1982; Conrad et al., 2002; Basu, 1997; Yermack, 1997; 
Skinner, 1994). However, the expectation-based method can only be used to analyse selected 
types of news, including earnings or dividend announcements. Another method is to use 
concurrent positive or negative stock returns around news announcements to categorise good 
or bad news (Engle and Ng, 1993; Jindrichovska and Mcleay, 2005). The stock-return-based 
method has an underlying assumption that abnormal returns are due solely to the news under 
study (Patell and Wolfson, 1982). Classifying news as good or bad using this method could 
be problematic when other news is released during the announcement event window of the 
news under study.  
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A number of previous studies employ computer-aided content analysis packages (e.g. 
Clatworthy and Jones, 2003; Tetlock, 2007; Tetlock et al., 2008; Malmendier and Tate, 2008; 
Kothari et al., 2009; Roger et al., 2011) or more advanced computational-linguistic methods 
(e.g. Antweiler and Frank, 2004; Li, 2010; De Franco et al., 2014) to code reports or news. 
For example, Clatworthy and Jones (2003) and Malmendier and Tate (2008) use a computer 
programme to extract news. Then they identify the tone of news or classify good and bad 
news by counting the number of positive and negative words, respectively. Tetlock (2007) 
and Tetlock et al. (2008) use an automated program, General Inquirer (GI), to identify the 
media tone by counting the number of words in each day’s Wall Street Journal column that 
fall within different categories based on GI’s IV-4 psychosocial dictionary. Building on 
research of the tools of computational linguistics content analysis, Antweiler and Frank 
(2004), Li (2010) and De Franco et al. (2014) employ a more advanced computational 
method, the Naïve Bayes computational process, to construct the proxy for the tone of the 
reports or news. This method can generate categorical predictions by aggregating the tone 
probabilities, which can increase the sample size compared with traditional coding methods. 
 
However, there are also potential limitations associated with the computational-
linguistic based measures of tone. These content analysis methods are prone to subjectivity in 
the analysis of narrative information, reports or news, as judgements and interpretations are 
usually inevitable during the process of defining positive and negative words (Clatworthy and 
Jones, 2003). Some computational processes (e.g. Naïve Bayes algorithm) introduce 
measurement errors, as acknowledged by De Franco et al. (2014). Furthermore, these content 
analysis based methods focus solely on information content and fail to consider the reception 
of the information, while a large body of literature shows that audience (i.e. the recipients of 
information) plays a very important role in processing information, and “individual frames” 
(Scheufele, 1999) may be used to interpret news. 
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3.2 Perception-based method 
 
In order to avoid the problems associated with existing methods in the finance 
literature, in this study we employ a perception-based method that has been widely applied in 
media and communication research (Sundar, 1998; Sundar, 1999; Tewksbury and Althaus, 
2000; d’Haenens et al., 2004). In this method, good or bad news is classified based on 
information recipients’ perceptions. This sub-section describes the participants and the 
procedure of news collection and classification.  
 
Participants 
 
Seven Chinese students enrolled in the MSc programme in finance at Durham 
University (UK) participated in the experiment for their Master’s dissertations. By the time 
they joined the experiment, they had finished all coursework for their MSc study and 
therefore had English language abilities and finance knowledge comparable to stock market 
investors. We did not offer payment because they used the collected data in their Master’s 
dissertations.   
 
Procedure 
 
To examine Chinese and English language press coverage, we use four leading 
newspapers in Chinese and four in English. Chinese language business publications include 
China Securities Journal, Yangzi Evening Post, Securities Times and First Financial Daily. 
English language publications include Financial Times, Wall Street Journal, China Daily and 
South China Morning Post. The Chinese news articles are collected via China National 
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Knowledge Infrastructure (CNKI), while the English news articles are collected via Factiva. 
These newspapers were randomly allocated to the students. Students searched the Chinese 
(English) firm names for A (B) stocks’ news and read the news stories online. Then they were 
asked to classify the news as good, bad or neutral, based on their perception. After identifying 
good and bad news, we count the number of good and bad news pieces reported in Chinese 
and English media. Next, we compute the ratio of good news to bad news for a given firm in 
Chinese and English media respectively, and then calculate the ratio of good vs bad news in 
Chinese media against good vs bad news in English media. The larger the ratio, the greater 
the divergence in the tone of news coverage between Chinese and English media. 
 
Using this method, our classification of good or bad news reflects the readers’ 
perception of the information. Compared with the expectation-based method, which only 
works for certain types of corporate disclosure (e.g. earnings announcements and dividend 
payment), the major advantage of this reader-perception-based method is that it allows us to 
study any type of news. In addition, our measure contains less noise than the stock-return-
based measure in the sense that the label (i.e. “good” or “bad”) perfectly matches each 
specific piece of news, whereas the label attached under the stock-return-based method could 
be misleading when there are multiple pieces of information released during a short event 
window, and it is difficult to conclude whether the change in stock price is due solely to the 
news under study. Our method could also circumvent the difficulty and subjectivity in 
defining positive and negative words in the content-analysis-based method. We are aware of 
the potential differences in readers’ perception of online and print news, as the delivery 
method (i.e. print or online) of news might affect readers’ estimates of a news story’s 
accuracy and believability (Sundar, 1999; Tewksbury and Althaus, 2000). However, in our 
paper, the online news articles extracted from the platforms (CNKI and Factiva) are exactly 
the same as those in print newspapers in terms of both content and structure. Therefore, we 
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expect that the online news in our sample has a very similar level of accuracy to that in print 
newspapers. In addition, all our online news articles clearly quote the sources (i.e. the names 
of the newspapers), which could effectively ameliorate the concern over the difference in 
credibility between online and print news. 
 
 
4. Sample selection and descriptive statistics 
 
 Our sample period covers 2004-2008. Some prior studies (e.g. Hou and Lee, 2014) 
suggest that the Split Share Structure Reform during the period 2005-2007 has a significant 
impact on the A-B share discount. To ensure consistency between the pre- and post-Split 
Share Structure Reform periods, we choose one year before the reform as our starting year 
and one year after the reform as the ending year of our sample period. We first identify all 
listed firms that have both A-shares and B-shares in the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock 
exchanges. Then we search for each of these cross-listed firms by name, and count the 
number of news articles about each firm. The search yields a total of 279,962 news reports 
about 88 firms during our sample period. Among these news reports, 100,185 reports are 
classified as good news, 4,738 reports are classified as bad news, and 175,039 reports are 
classified as neutral news. 
 
We use the China Center of Economic Research (CCER) and Chinese Security 
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) databases to collect the data items for the 
computation of our variables. These items include market capitalization, stock turnover, state-
control status, percentage of restricted shares, year of reform for each specific firm, stock 
return, return on assets, sales, debts, equity, debt-to-equity ratio, concentration of ownership, 
CEO shareholding, CEO-chairman status, number of independent directors, number of board 
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members, number of board meetings, industrial classifications and regions. In addition, we 
obtain Chinese domestic market returns from Datastream and US stock market returns from 
the Center for Research in Security Prices (CRSP). We also winsorize the top and bottom 1% 
of all non-dummy variables in order to deal with outliers. We require all of the variables to 
have valid values. Our final sample consists of 4,218 firm-month observations of 86 firms. 
There are 239,393 news reports (238,353 Chinese news and 1,040 English news) about these 
firms. 
 
Panel A of Table 1 presents the descriptive statistics of our variables. The monthly A-
B share discount (ForeignDiscount) is 43.66% on average over our sample period. The ratio 
of Chinese language good to bad news over the ratio of English language good news reports 
(RGB_NEWS) is 20.39%, indicating that the news coverage available to A-share investors is, 
on average, 20.39 (i.e. 20.39% multiplied by the scale factor 100) times more positive than 
that to B-share investors for the same firm.
 9
 The average number of Chinese language good 
news reports (CGNEWS) is 0.2005, while that of Chinese language bad news reports 
(CBNEWS) is only 0.0096. The big gap also shows the significant asymmetry in good and 
bad news reports in Chinese media and indicates that there is a very high level of positivity in 
Chinese news media. As Chinese media is virtually owned by the state, the descriptive 
statistics may suggest that the Chinese government censors negative news in order to 
maintain social and economic stability. The average number of English language good news 
reports (EGNEWS) and English language bad news reports (EBNEWS) is 0.14 (i.e. 0.0014 
                                                        
9 It should be noted that B-share investors also include some Chinese investors who have bought B-shares since 
the B-share market opened up to domestic investors. However, these Chinese investors are very different from 
those A-share investors in terms of information channels. As the B-share market is only open to domestic 
investors who hold foreign currency accounts, Chinese B-share investors must have either business or personal 
connections with foreign countries. Due to holding foreign currencies and their foreign connections, they usually 
have both a strong incentive to search for English news and the channels through which they can access English 
media. Therefore, these Chinese B-share investors could be very similar to foreign B-share investors in terms of 
their information acquisition. Furthermore, the B-share market is still largely dominated by foreign investors, as 
domestic investors are restricted by the limits of their access to foreign currencies due to the tight currency 
control in China (Tan, 2011). 
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multiplied by the scale factor 100) and 0.03 (i.e. 0.0003 multiplying the scale factor 100), 
respectively. Although there are also more positive news reports than negative news reports 
in English news media, the gap between them is much narrower compared with Chinese news 
media. In addition, it should be noted that the mean and the median of StateControl are 0.793 
and 1, respectively, indicating that the majority of the dual-listed firms in our sample are 
state-owned firms. This sample characteristic would allow us to better capture the media 
influence, in that state ownership may bring about more media favouritism.   
 
Panel B presents the total number of news reports and the ratio of good to bad news in 
Chinese and English news media, respectively. The average of the total number of Chinese 
language news reports (i.e. Chinese good and bad news reports) is 56.5085, while that of 
English language news reports is only 0.2466. The big difference shows that these dual-listed 
firms receive more Chinese media coverage than English media coverage, on average. In 
addition, Panel B also shows that the ratio of Chinese good to bad news (21.0126) is much 
higher than English good to bad news (1.1226), which suggests that, on average, Chinese 
news reports about dual-listed firms are more positive than English news reports.  
 
Panel C presents the proportion of good, bad and neutral news reports in Chinese 
news, in English news and in all news (i.e. Chinese news and English news combined), 
respectively. We observe that the average proportion of neutral news reports in Chinese news 
is 59.48%, much higher than that in English news (22.4%). The average proportion of bad 
news reports in Chinese news (4.35%) is much lower than that in English news (36.16%). 
Although the average proportion of good news reports in Chinese news (4.35%) is also lower 
than that in English news (60.45%), the ratio of the average proportion of good news reports 
to bad news reports in Chinese news (0.3616/0.0435≈8.31) is much higher than that in 
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English news (0.6045/0.1714≈3.53). This suggests that Chinese news is relatively more 
positive than English news on average. We also show how these proportions change over our 
sample period, on average, in Figure 2. Specifically, Figure 2 (a) shows the average 
proportion of good, bad and neutral news reports in Chinese news by month. Figure 2 (b) 
shows the average proportion of good, bad and neutral news reports in English news by 
month. Figure 2 (c) shows the average proportion of good, bad and neutral news reports in all 
news (i.e. Chinese news and English news combined) by month. The solid line, the dotted 
line and the fine line represent good news, bad news and neutral news, respectively. 
 
5. Media control and foreign share discount 
 
5.1 Favouritism in news and foreign share discount 
 
The English media is considered to be more independent, as they are not subject to the 
intervention of the Chinese government, while the Chinese media tends to lack independence 
and issues more positive news. Thus, we predict that the positive biased tone of news 
coverage of Chinese and English media as reflected by the ratio of good to bad news reported 
in Chinese and English media could lead to a larger foreign share discount. To test the 
prediction, we use the following regression model: 
 
ForeignDiscounti,t = α0 + α1 RGB_NEWSi,t 
+ α2 RelativeMVi,t-1+ α3 RelativeTOi,t-1 + α4 StateControli,t-1+ α5 Reformi,t + 
α6RelativeRETi,t-1 
+ α7 Betai,t-1 + α8 FSIi,t-1 + α9 ROAi,,t-1 + α10 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + α11 TobinQi,t-1 + α12 
Leveragei,t-1 
+ α13 OwnershipCi,t-1 + α14 CHOLDi,t-1 + α15 CDUALi,t-1 + α16 BINDPi,t-1 + α17 BSIZEi,t-1  
+ α18 BMEETi,t-1 + Region + Industry + Firm + Year + εit                                                                (1) 
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We also explore whether a certain type of news (i.e. Chinese/English good/bad news) affects 
the foreign share discount in the following regression model: 
 
ForeignDiscounti,t = β0 + β1 CGNEWSi,t + β2 EBNEWSi,t 
+ β3 RelativeMVi,t-1 + β4 RelativeTOi,t-1 + β5 StateControli,t-1 + β6 Reformi,t + β7 
RelativeRETi,t-1 
+ β8 Betai,t-1 + β9 FSIi,t-1 + β10 ROAi,t-1 + β11 SalesGrowthi,t-1 + β12 TobinQi,t-1 + β13 
Leveragei,t-1 
+ β14 OwnershipCi,t-1 + β15 CHOLDi,t-1 + β16 CDUALi,t-1 + β17 BINDPi,t-1 + β18 BSIZEi,t-1  
+ β19 BMEETi,t-1 + Region + Industry + Firm + Year +εit                                                                 (2) 
 
In our regression models, the dependent variable, ForeignDiscounti,t, represents the 
discount in B-shares of firm i at the end of month t. It is defined as the price of A-shares 
minus the price of B-shares divided by the price of A-shares. According to this definition, the 
higher the value of ForeignDiscounti,t, the greater the foreign share discount. We use the key 
independent variables RGB_NEWSi,t in Equation (1) and CGNEWSi,t and EBNEWSi,t in 
Equation (2). RGB_NEWSi,t is the ratio of Chinese language good to bad news over the ratio 
of English language good to bad news, divided by 100. The ratio of Chinese (English) 
language good to bad news is the number of Chinese (English) good news reports over the 
number of Chinese (English) bad news reports. Based on this definition, a higher value of 
RGB_NEWSi,t indicates relatively more positive news exposure of A-share investors relative 
to that of B-share investors of the same firm. CGNEWSi,t and EBNEWSi,t in Equation (2) are 
defined as the number of Chinese good news reports divided by 100 and the number of 
English bad news reports divided by 100, respectively.
10
 
 
                                                        
10 The number of Chinese bad news reports (i.e. CBNEWS) and the number of English good news reports (i.e. 
EGNEWS) are not included in the regression, because the high correlation between CGNEWS and CBNEWS 
and the high correlation between EBNEWS and EGNEWS could result in the problem of the multicollinearity. 
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Our regression models also include four groups of control variables. The first group of 
variables is used to consider information asymmetry (Chan et al., 2008), market liquidity 
(Chen et al., 2001), ownership structure (Hou and Lee, 2012) and investor speculation (Mei et 
al., 2009), as they are discussed in prior research as potential explanations for the Chinese 
foreign share discount. RelativeMVi,t−1 is defined as the market capitalization of A-shares 
divided by that of B-shares at the end of the previous month. As the size of firms is generally 
believed to be negatively related to information asymmetry, firms with large relative size of 
A-shares to B-shares, measured by market capitalization, could have higher levels of 
information asymmetry between A-share investors and B-share investors. RelativeTOi,t−1 is 
defined as the turnover of A-shares divided by that of B-shares at the end the previous month. 
This ratio is used to control for the relative liquidity of A-shares to B-shares. StateControli,t-1 
is a dummy variable equal to 1 if a firm is state-controlled, and 0 otherwise. Reformi,t is a 
dummy variable equal to 1 for the year of and the years after Split Share Structure Reform, 
and 0 for the years before this reform. Prior studies suggest that majority shareholders and 
outside minority shareholders are likely to have a higher level of conflict of interest in state-
controlled firms and before the reform. RelativeRETi,t−1 is defined as the stock returns of A-
shares divided by that of B-shares in the previous month. Prior studies show that high past 
returns could increase speculation activities. Including this variable in our regressions could 
help us control for the relative movement between the price of A-shares and that of B-shares. 
 
Our second group of control variables consists of the factors related to equity cost of 
capital. Betai,t−1  is used to control for the systematic risk of a firm and is defined as the beta 
in CAPM in the previous year. We estimate it by regressing the daily excess return of each 
firm on daily excess returns of the market for the past year. FSIi,t−1 is used as a proxy for the 
change in the firm-specific information environment. It is defined as the change in the 
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residual variance of the informativeness of share price in the previous year. Following the 
method employed in Fernandes and Ferreira (2008), we first obtain the R-square (i.e. 
goodness of fit) by regressing the weekly excess returns of each firm on both Chinese and US 
weekly market excess returns. We then calculate the natural log of the ratio of (1-R-square) to 
R-square as the value of this variable. ROAi,t−1 represents the return on assets based on 
industry median adjustment in the last fiscal year. This is used as the measure of a firm’s 
profitability and defined as the ratio of operating income to total assets. ∆SalesGrowthi,t−1 is 
defined as the change of sales growth in percentage in the last fiscal year. It is used to control 
for the growth on the demand side. TobinQi,t−1 represents the Tobin’s Q of the firm and serves 
as a proxy for firm performance. It is calculated as the ratio of the sum of debt and market 
value to total equity in the last fiscal year. Leveragei,t−1 is the ratio of debt to equity of the last 
fiscal year. It is used to control for financial distress. 
 
Our third group of control variables consists of the factors related to the quality of corporate 
governance. Prior studies (Lombardo and Pagano, 2002; Tong and Yu, 2011) show that 
governance has a significant impact on equity cost capital and could help explain the Chinese 
foreign share discount. OwnershipCi,t−1 represents the concentration of ownership in the last 
fiscal year. We measure the concentration by using the Herfindahl index, which considers the 
holdings of the firm’s ten largest shareholders. CHOLDi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if 
the shareholding of a CEO in a firm fell in the top 25 percent or the bottom 25 percent of 
cross-sectional shareholdings of CEOs in the previous year, and 0 otherwise.
11
 This variable 
is used to control for the effects of potential agency problems, as prior studies show that high 
CEO ownership may lead to managerial entrenchment, while low CEO ownership may result 
in the insufficient alignment of CEOs’ and shareholders’ interests. CDUALi,t−1 is a dummy 
                                                        
11 As a robustness check, we also use the raw value of the proportion of shares held by the CEO instead of the 
dummy variable (CHOLD) to run regressions in Equations (1) and (2). The results are essentially unchanged, as 
shown in Appendix D.1 and Appendix D.2. 
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variable equal to 1 if the CEO of a firm was also the board chair in the last fiscal year, and 0 
otherwise. Boards tend to have relatively less monitoring power when the CEO of the firm 
also sits on the board as the chair. BINDPi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the proportion 
of independent directors on the board was higher than the cross-sectional median proportion 
in the last fiscal year, and 0 otherwise. Prior studies show that independent directors usually 
play a more effective role in monitoring managers. BSIZEi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 
if the board size of a firm in the last fiscal year was larger than the cross-sectional median 
board size, and 0 otherwise. BMEETi,t−1 is a dummy variable equal to 1 if the number of 
board meetings of a firm in the last fiscal year was greater than the cross-sectional median 
number of board meetings, and 0 otherwise. The higher frequency of board meetings might 
indicate more active monitoring of a board. We also consider firm, year and month fixed 
effects in our regressions. 
 
 Table 2 presents the regression analyses of the test. Regression 1 shows that after 
controlling for firm and year fixed effects, the coefficient of RGB_NEWS is significantly 
positive (coef. = 0.0076, t = 2.01). After controlling for other determinants of foreign share 
discounts, the coefficient of RGB_NEWS is still significantly positive in Regressions 2 and 3. 
We also add month fixed effects in Regression 4 and 5, and the coefficients and significance 
levels are essentially unchanged. The results suggest that the fact that Chinese news is more 
positive than English news contributes to the foreign share discount puzzle. The divergence 
of tone in the news media seems to have a significant impact on A-share and B-share prices, 
consistent with Tetlock (2007, 2008). Specifically, due to tight government control, Chinese 
media is relatively more reluctant to report negative news than English media, which could 
lead A-share investors to be more optimistic about a firm than B-share investors and thus 
trade up the A-share price. By contrast, foreign media is considered to be more objective and 
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more likely to report negative news than Chinese media, which could lead B-share investors 
to be more pessimistic about a firm than A-share investors and thus trade down the B-share 
price. Therefore, the divergence of tone in the media could increase the difference between A-
share and B-share prices and, consequently, lead to a larger foreign share discount. Our 
finding provides an alternative/complementary explanation for the foreign share discount 
puzzle, showing that not only the levels of news coverage, as suggested by Cumming et al. 
(2016), but also the tone of news media is important in explaining the foreign share 
discount.
12
    
 
The coefficients of most control variables are largely in line with the findings in prior 
studies. In particular, across Regression 2 to Regression 5, we find significant positive 
coefficients for both RelativeMV and RelativeTO, which suggests that firms with higher 
levels of information asymmetry (Chan et al., 2008) and lower levels of liquidity (Chen et al., 
2001) are likely to have higher discounts in their B-shares. Consistent with Hou and Lee 
(2012), we also find a significant positive coefficient for StateControl
13
 and a significant 
negative coefficient for Reform, which suggests that more conflicts of interest between 
majority shareholders and minority shareholders could lead to a higher discount in B-shares. 
In addition, we report that the coefficients of Beta and OwnershipC are significantly positive, 
and the coefficient of ROA is significantly negative in Regression 3 and Regression 4. These 
results suggest that the higher foreign share discount of a firm could be associated with higher 
exposure of systematic risks, higher ownership concentration and lower profitability.  
                                                        
12 To examine whether our results are distorted by the firm-month observations in which there is no English 
news, we remove those observations and rerun the parallel regressions. Our results are robust to the exclusion of 
those observations. 
13 To further examine whether media censorship plays a larger role in state-controlled firms in explaining the 
foreign share discount, we split the full sample into two subsamples, state-controlled firms and non-state-
controlled firms. Then we run regressions using Equation (2) for both subsamples, respectively. We find that the 
coefficient of RGB_NEWS is only significant in the state-controlled subsample, and not in the non-state-
controlled subsample, as reported in Appendix C. 
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5.2 The number of good vs bad news reports 
 
        
Our result in Table 2 shows a significant positive association between the relative 
positivity of Chinese media to English media, as measured by RGB_NEWS, and foreign 
share discount. In this section, we further explore whether this relation is mainly driven by 
Chinese good news or English bad news, by using Equation (2) to run regressions. Table 3 
presents the regression results. We find that the coefficients of CGNEWS (i.e. Chinese good 
news) are significant and positive across Regression 1 to Regression 6. In particular, the 
coefficient of CGNEWS is significantly positive (coef. = 0.0079, t = 1.79), after controlling 
for firm and year fixed effects in Regression 1.
14
 This result is in line with our findings in 
Table 2, suggesting that more Chinese good news could result in a higher A-share price and, 
consequently, the gap between A-share price and B-share price would widen (i.e. there would 
be a larger foreign share discount), ceteris paribus. In Regression 2, we include in our model 
a comprehensive set of control variables to control for firm-specific characteristics and other 
possible explanations. The result shows that the coefficient of CGNEWS is even higher and 
more significant (coef. = 0.0085, t = 3.16) than in Regression 1. When we further add firm 
and year fixed effects, the coefficient of CGNEWS is still significantly positive (coef. = 
0.0071, t = 1.85), although the magnitude and the significance level decrease slightly, as 
shown in Regression 3. On the other hand, we find the signs of the coefficients of EBNEWS 
(i.e. English bad news) are positive across all specifications, although not statistically 
significant. The positive signs are consistent with our prediction that more English bad news 
                                                        
14  In Appendix E, we also present the results of the regressions based on the unscaled CGNEWS and EBNEWS 
(i.e. unscaled by 100). The coefficient of CGNEWS in Regression 1 is 0.0001 (sig. at 10% level), suggesting that 
the increase of one Chinese good news report is associated with a one basis point increase in the foreign share 
discount. 
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could result in a lower B-share price and, consequently, the gap between A-share price and B-
share price would widen (i.e. there would be a larger foreign share discount), ceteris paribus.  
 
After examining the impact of Chinese good news and English bad news, respectively, 
we further investigate the potential joint effect of both types of news on foreign share 
discount. To conduct the test, we include an interaction term, CGNEWS*EBNEWS, in 
Equation (2) and run the regressions. Interestingly, we find that the coefficient of the 
interaction term is significantly positive (coef. = 2.035, t = 2.32) in Regression 4. It should be 
noted that when including all fixed effects in Regression 7, the coefficient of the interaction 
term is still significant, although the coefficient of CGNEWS loses significance. This result 
suggests that the positive association between the number of Chinese good news reports and 
the foreign share discount is strongest when the number of English bad news reports is 
greater. In other words, a greater number of Chinese good news reports may result in an 
increase in A-share price, and a greater number of English bad news reports may result in a 
decrease in B-share price; when both effects work concurrently, the foreign share discount is 
expected to be the greatest. Our result is consistent with this expectation. The result is similar 
when we run parallel regressions with firm, year and month fixed effects. 
 
Taking the results together, we find evidence that more Chinese good news and more 
English bad news are both associated with a greater foreign share discount; and the positive 
Chinese media seems to play a larger and more significant role in explaining the foreign share 
discount. Moreover, our results suggest that the joint effect of both types of news could result 
in the widest gap between A-share price and B-share price and, consequently, lead to the 
greatest foreign share discount.  
 
  
29 
 
6. Additional analysis and robustness tests 
 
6.1 Investors’ attention 
 
 
Previous sections discuss the impact on the foreign share discount of the divergence in 
tone between Chinese and English news. The underlying assumption of this association is that 
investors do pay attention to media coverage. As argued by Kahneman (1973), investor 
attention is a scarce cognitive resource, and investors have limited attention. Since the market 
is constantly exposed to all types of media coverage and news, it is important to establish the 
link between media coverage and investors’ attention. Without investors paying sufficient 
attention or considering the news in their assessment of asset allocation, it is difficult for the 
media to play a role in security pricing and to conclude that the association between a certain 
type of media coverage and security price is meaningful (Da et al., 2011). In our study, it is 
particularly important to take investors’ attention into consideration when examining the 
impact of the tone of news reports on stock returns in the Chinese stock market. As the 
Chinese media is under tight government control, it is unclear and undocumented in the 
literature whether investors pay any attention to the news in general or to a particular type of 
news (such as good versus bad news) reported in the Chinese media. The argument that the 
divergence in the tone of news coverage between Chinese and English media could result in 
the gap between A-share price and B-share price hinges on the condition that investors do pay 
attention to news. In other words, investors could only respond to news reports if they pay 
attention to them. Furthermore, although prior research documents evidence on the 
correlation between news and the movement in security prices (e.g. Skinner and Sloan, 2002), 
there is a missing link in the documented correlation – whether certain types of news attract 
more investor attention than others. The test of such correlation is important, as investors’ 
responses are not only related to their news exposure (i.e. the number and tone of news 
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reports) but also depend on how much attention they pay to different types of news (i.e. 
Chinese/English good/bad news). Therefore, in our study we specifically examine investor 
attention to Chinese/English good/bad news, respectively.  
 
Following Da et al. (2011), who first proposed the measure, we use the Search 
Volume Index (SVI) as an ex post measure of investors’ active attention. The rationale is, if 
an investor is searching for a firm, it is clear that the investor is paying attention to that firm. 
Some recent studies (e.g. Da et al., 2011; Drake et al., 2012; Andrei and Hasler, 2014; 
Vozlyublennaia, 2014; Ding and Hou, 2015) show that SVI is correlated with other measures 
of investor attention and captures investor attention in a more timely manner than other 
measures. Moreover, SVI predicts stock prices in two weeks’ time and their reversals, and is 
correlated with various price indexes. Our data source for SVI is Google Trends, which 
provides the frequency of search terms, dating back to January 2004. SVI for a search term is 
calculated as the number of searches for that term scaled by its time-series average. For our 
study, we identify search frequencies by the Chinese and English names of our sample firms, 
respectively, in Google Trends (https://www.google.com/trends/). We download the weekly 
SVIs for individual stocks, and then convert the weekly SVIs to monthly sum SVIs by 
aggregating the weekly SVIs in each month. We also calculate the average and the median of 
the weekly SVIs in each month. Finally, the sum, the average and the median SVIs are scaled 
by 100.  
 
Table 4 presents the correlations of A-share (B-share) investor attention with Chinese 
(English) language good and bad news under firm and year fixed effects controls. We use the 
sum, the average and the median Chinese (English) SVI as the proxy for A-share (B-share) 
investor attention. The results in Panel A show that Chinese good news coverage is 
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significantly positively correlated with the sum (coef. = 0.1739, sig. at 1%), the average (coef. 
= 0.0401, sig. at 1%) and the median (coef. = 0.0396, sig. at 1%) level of attention from A-
share investors. On the other hand, there is no significant correlation between Chinese bad 
news coverage and the level of attention from A-share investors. These findings may suggest 
that A-share investors are heavily influenced by the positive tone of Chinese media and pay 
more attention to good news than to bad news. Consequently, the extremely high level of 
attention of A-share investors to good news could result in their over-reaction to good news. 
This is consistent with our finding in Table 3 that, all else being equal, a larger number of 
Chinese good news reports widen the gap between A-share and B-share price (i.e. increase 
the foreign share discount), as A-share investors tend to pay more attention to and over-react 
to good news.  
 
By contrast, the results in Panel B show that English bad news coverage is 
significantly positively correlated with the sum (coef. = 20.7203, sig. at 5%), the average 
(coef. = 4.2445, sig. at 5%) and the median (coef. = 4.1698, sig. at 5%) level of attention from 
B-share investors, but there is no significant correlation between English good news coverage 
and the level of attention from B-share investors. The results indicate that B-share investors 
pay more attention to bad news, which could lead to their over-reaction to bad news. One 
possible explanation for B-share investors’ high level of attention to bad news is that they are 
likely to be heavily influenced by the general tone of English media. As shown in Panel B of 
Table 1, English media is much less positive (i.e. relatively more negative) about Chinese 
cross-listing firms than Chinese media, on average. Therefore, bad news could attract more 
attention from B-share investors than good news, given the relatively negative tone of the 
English media. Furthermore, B-share investors could find bad news more salient than good 
news, due to their relatively high degree of loss aversion, a key feature of prospect theory 
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(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979), whereas A-share investors are less likely to have a high 
degree of loss aversion due to the home bias (Graham et al., 2009). Because of their loss 
aversion, B-share investors care more about losses than gains, even if they are of the same 
magnitude. B-share investors may even be concerned about unknown problems, because the 
released bad news could be the “tip of the iceberg”. Such concern may result in a large drop 
in B-share price. Therefore, English bad news could have a stronger impact on the share price 
of cross-listed firms than English good news.  
 
In brief, the results presented in Panels A and B of Table 4 suggest that good news 
attracts more attention from A-share investors, whereas bad news attracts more attention from 
B-share investors. Consequently, A-share investors are likely to over-react to Chinese good 
news and B-share investors are likely to over-react to English bad news, which could increase 
the gap between A-share and B-share price (i.e. increase the foreign share discount). These 
findings provide supporting evidence of the link between media coverage and investor 
attention, and they highlight the possible channels (i.e. Chinese good news and English bad 
news) through which the tone of media is likely to have an impact on the foreign share 
discount.  
 
6.2. Information asymmetry 
 
As discussed in previous sections, the information asymmetry between Chinese media 
and English media could help explain the foreign share discount. However, previous studies 
(Frieder and Subrahmanyam, 2005; Yohn, 1998; Cumming et al., 2016) show that analyst 
following might mitigate the effect of such information asymmetry. Financial analysts 
regularly generate analyst reports on the performance of the firms they follow, which provide 
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additional/alternative information about the firms to investors. Analyst reports are usually 
believed to be more informative and credible, as financial analysts are more knowledgeable 
about the firms than journalists. Therefore, investors are likely to rely more on analyst reports 
and less on news media whenever analyst reports are available. Thus, the effect of the 
information asymmetry in news media is expected to be less pronounced among firms with 
greater financial analyst following.  
 
Therefore, we conduct an additional analysis to examine whether analyst following 
has an impact on the relationship between the divergence in the ratio of good to bad news 
between Chinese and English media and the foreign share discount for a firm. To test the 
impact of analyst following, we split the full sample into two subsamples based on the sample 
median of analyst following. Specifically, we include a firm in the low-following subsample 
if the natural log of the number of analysts following it is lower than the median of the natural 
log of the number of analysts following it. Otherwise, we include the firm in the high-
following subsample. We then run regressions using Equation (1) for both subsamples, 
respectively. The results are presented in the first two columns of Table 5. We report that the 
coefficient of RGB_NEWS is only significantly positive (coef.= 0.00637, t = 1.823) in the 
high-following subsample (i.e. low information asymmetry) in Regression 2, and not in the 
low-following subsample (i.e. high information asymmetry) in Regression 1. This implies 
that investors could be significantly influenced by the tone of media coverage when there are 
many analysts following. This finding contradicts Cumming et al. (2016), who suggest that 
the effect of the level of media coverage (i.e. number of news reports) on the foreign share 
discount is more pronounced among firms with a lower analyst following, as investors may 
depend on media coverage more if analysts’ reports are less available. A plausible 
explanation for our results might be that firms with a greater analyst following usually 
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provide more informative disclosure (Lang and Lundholm, 1996). News about these firms 
could attract more attention from investors due to the high level of informativeness in the 
news, and consequently the tone of the news could have a greater impact on investors. 
Indeed, the results in Panel C of Table 4 show that the level of analyst following
15
 is 
positively correlated with the sum (coef. = 0.6329, sig. at 5%), the average (coef. = 0.1460, 
sig. at 5%) and the median (coef. = 0.1446, sig. at 5%) level of investors’ attention proxied by 
the SVI. This finding suggests that investors pay more attention to news reports about firms 
with a greater analyst following.  
 
We also use analyst forecast dispersion as an alternative proxy for information 
asymmetry in our regressions, considering that analysts may be more likely to follow large 
firms or industry leaders, and the number of analysts following could be an inappropriate 
measure of information asymmetry. Forecast dispersion is calculated as the standard 
deviation of the Current EPS estimate for the specified fiscal time period, divided by the 
mean EPS estimate. Then we split the full sample into two subsamples based on the sample 
median of forecast dispersion. Specifically, we include a firm in the high-forecast-dispersion 
subsample if forecast dispersion is higher than the median forecast dispersion. Otherwise, we 
include the firm in the low-forecast-dispersion subsample. We run regressions using Equation 
(1) for both subsamples, respectively. The results are presented in the last two columns in 
Table 5. The coefficient of RGB_NEWS is only significantly positive (coef. = 0.00980, t = 
2.052) in the low-forecast-dispersion subsample (i.e. low information asymmetry) in 
Regression 4, and not in the high-forecast-dispersion subsample (i.e. low information 
asymmetry) in Regression 3. Therefore, the results based on the alternative proxy (i.e. 
forecast dispersion) are very similar to those based on the number of analyst following. 
                                                        
15The level of analyst following is defined as the natural log of the number of analysts following multiplied by 
100. 
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6.3. Robustness tests 
 
We conduct several analyses to test the robustness of our results. First, as there might 
be an omitted variable concern for the relation between favouritism in news and foreign share 
discount, we use a change-in-change approach to address this potential problem. Specifically, 
we take the first difference by month for both the dependent variable and the independent 
variable. Then we run regressions using Equation (1). The results are presented in Table 6. 
The coefficient of RGB_NEWS is positive and highly significant across all specifications, 
similar to the results in Table 2. 
 
Second, we run robustness tests using the Propensity Score Matching (PSM) 
approach. We use a nearest-neighbour propensity score matching based on year, month, 
industry,
16
 region,
17
 and firm and board characteristics (including market value, turnover, 
state ownership, stock returns, Beta, FSI, ROA, sales growth, Tobin’s Q, ownership 
concentration, CEO shareholding, CEO duality, board independence, board size and number 
of board meetings). The results are presented in Table 7, and they are very similar to those 
presented in Table 2. 
 
Third, to facilitate the interpretation of the coefficients, we log transform both the 
dependent variable and the main independent variable in Equation (1). We also remove the 
scale factor (i.e. 100) from the main independent variable. Then we re-run the regressions. 
The results are presented in Table 8. Regression 1 shows that after controlling for firm and 
                                                        
16 Industries are defined based on the Global Industry Classification Standard (GICS) code. We consider the first 
two digits of the GICS code in our industry classification. 
17 We follow Firth et al. (2006) to define regions according to the level of economic development. 
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year fixed effects, the coefficient of RGB_NEWS is significantly positive (coef. = 0.0106, t = 
2.37). This suggests that a one percent change in the relative favouritism in Chinese to 
English news increases the foreign share discount by approximately one basis point. After 
controlling for other determinants of foreign share discounts, the coefficient of RGB_NEWS 
is still significantly positive across Regression 2 to Regression 5. 
 
Finally, as Cumming et al. (2016) find that the logarithm of the ratio of Chinese to 
English news reports affects the foreign share discount, we further examine whether our 
results are driven by such effect. We split the full sample into two subsamples based on the 
ratio of Chinese to English news reports. Specifically, we include a firm in the low-ratio 
subsample if the ratio of Chinese to English news reports is lower than the median of the ratio 
of Chinese to English news reports. Otherwise, we include the firm in the high-ratio 
subsample. We then run regressions using Equation (1) for both subsamples, respectively. 
The results are presented in Appendix B. We find that the coefficient of RGB_NEWS is 
significantly positive in both the low-ratio and the high-ratio subsamples, which suggests that 
our results are not likely to be driven by the ratio of the number of Chinese to English news 
reports.  
 
7. Conclusion 
 
This paper examines the effect of media censorship on stock price and foreign stock 
investments, using the setting of the foreign share discount puzzle in China, a topical issue in 
the literature. Existing studies on the puzzle have provided various explanations, such as the 
differential demand hypothesis (Stulz and Wasserfallen, 1995), the illiquidity risk of foreign 
shares (Amihud and Mendelson, 1986; Lee et al., 2001), speculative trading behaviours in the 
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A-share market (Scheinkman and Xiong, 2003) and the information disadvantage of B-share 
investors (Brennan and Cao, 1997). Besides these explanations, the role of the media in 
explaining the Chinese foreign share discount is attracting growing attention. For example, 
Cumming et al. (2016) show that the differential level of Chinese and English news coverage 
is significantly related to the foreign share discount. However, most studies in this area only 
explore the impact of the level of media coverage (i.e. the number of news reports in Chinese 
and English media) on the foreign share discount. Our study focuses on the role of an 
important institutional feature of the media, media censorship, in explaining the foreign share 
discount, by employing a direct measure of good and bad news based on readers’ perceptions.  
 
Our findings are summarised as follows. First, we show that Chinese media is 
generally much more positive about firms with dual classes of shares than English media, 
suggesting that the Chinese government may censor negative news to maintain economic 
stability. More importantly, such media censorship could affect stock price. Specifically, we 
find that firms with a higher level of positive news reports in Chinese relative to English 
media are associated with greater foreign share discounts. This result suggests that A-share 
investors are significantly influenced by the favourable tone of Chinese media, resulting in a 
larger difference between A-share and B-share price. In particular, we find that the larger the 
number of Chinese good news reports, the greater the foreign share discount, which is 
consistent with A-share price being higher and the gap between A-share and B-share price 
being wider when more favourable news is reported in Chinese media, all else being equal. 
Second, the co-existence of a large number of Chinese good news reports and a large number 
of English bad news reports could result in the widest gap between A-share price and B-share 
price and therefore lead to the highest level of foreign share discount. Third, using SVI to 
capture investors’ attention, we report evidence that English bad news attracts more attention 
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from B-share investors, whereas Chinese good news attracts more attention from A-share 
investors. This may also help to explain the observed B-share investors’ over-reaction to bad 
news. Finally, we show the effect of the positivity in Chinese news relative to English news 
on the foreign share discount to be more pronounced among firms with a better information 
environment, reflected by greater analyst coverage. Lang and Lundholm (1996) conclude that 
there is usually greater analyst following if firms provide more informative disclosures. It 
could be expected that news of these firms could contain more informative content and 
therefore attract more attention from investors, consequently having a greater impact on the 
price difference between A-B shares.   
 
Our study has two important implications. First, media censorship could significantly 
affect international asset pricing. As shown in the Chinese setting, the government’s tight 
control of the release of negative information leads to a wide divergence between the tone of 
Chinese and English media, and could have undesired capital market consequences (i.e. a 
large foreign share discount). Second, besides the level and tone of media coverage, the 
attention of domestic and foreign investors could also play an important role in explaining the 
impact of media coverage on the foreign share discount. 
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Figure 1. Average Foreign Share Discount (Jan 1998 – Dec 2008) 
 
This figure shows the average monthly foreign share discounts of Chinese firms between January 
1998 and December 2008. 
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Figure 2. Average proportion of good/bad/neutral news reports 
 
This figure shows the average monthly proportion of good/bad/neutral news reports in 
Chinese/English/total over our sample period. 
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Table 1. Summary statistics 
 
This table presents the summary statistics of the variables. The variables are defined in Appendix A. 
  
Panel A   Variables 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Med Min Max Obs. 
 
ForeignDiscount 0.4366 0.1556 0.4513 0.0239 0.8069 4,218 
RGB_NEWS 0.2039 0.6400 0.0100 0 7.1700 4,218 
CGNEWS 0.2005 0.6097 0 0 3.4400 4,218 
CBNEWS 0.0096 0.0721 0 0 1.2000 4,218 
EGNEWS 0.0014 0.0059 0 0 0.0700 4,218 
EBNEWS 0.0003 0.0026 0 0 0.1000 4,218 
RelativeMV 1.1027 0.0894 1.0946 0.9400 1.3677 4,218 
RelativeTO 1.3718 0.2565 1.3320 0.6769 4.0320 4,218 
StateControl 0.7930 0.4052 1 0 1 4,218 
Reform 0.4912 0.5000 0 0 1 4,218 
RelativeRET 0.9928 6.1070 0.8466 -118.3679 168.6101 4,218 
Beta 1.1319 0.3394 1.1276 0.0953 2.8371 4,218 
FSI -0.5561 1.9583 0.0156 -19.9922 0.9502 4,218 
ROA 0.0002 0.0200 0.0014 -0.1021 0.0442 4,218 
∆SalesGrowth 0.2737 1.2348 0.1384 -0.8090 14.9185 4,218 
TobinQ 0.6893 0.2431 0.7205 0.0001 1.5510 4,218 
Leverage 0.5513 0.2722 0.5205 0.0874 2.0497 4,218 
OwnershipC 0.1736 0.1263 0.1295 0.0044 0.6748 4,218 
CHOLD 0.3046 0.4603 0 0 1 4,218 
CDUAL 0.0308 0.1729 0 0 1 4,218 
BINDP 0.1036 0.3048 0 0 1 4,218 
BSIZE 0.3480 0.4764 0 0 1 4,218 
BMEET 0.5372 0.4987 1 0 1 4,218 
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Panel B   Number of news reports and the ratio of good to bad news per firm-month 
 Mean Std. Dev. Med Min Max Obs. 
       
Total number of Chinese language news reports 56.5085 129.1882 0 0 600 4,218 
Total number of English language news reports 0.2466 0.9016 0 0 10 4,218 
Chinese language good to bad news  21.0126 60.9803 1 0.0083 345 4,218 
English language good to bad news  1.1226 0.5957 1 0.0909 8 4,218 
       
Panel C   Proportion of good, bad and neutral news reports 
 Mean Std. Dev. Med Min Max Obs. 
       
Chinese news 
 
Good 0.3616 0.3335 0.4665 0 1 4,218 
Bad 0.0435 0.1488 0 0 1 4,218 
Neutral 0.5948 0.3191 0.5 0 1 4,218 
       
English news 
 
Good 0.6045 0.4606 1 0 1 4,218 
Bad 0.1714 0.3577 0 0 1 4,218 
Neutral 0.2240 0.3639 0 0 1 4,218 
       
All news 
 
Good 0.3936 0.3543 0.4930 0 1 4,218 
Bad 0.0569 0.1832 0 0 1 4,218 
Neutral 0.5495 0.3404 0.4857 0 1 4,218 
       
The sample period covers 2004 to 2008 and includes A- and B-share cross-listing firms that traded in both the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. 
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Table 2. The impact of favouritism in Chinese to English news on the foreign share discount 
 
This table presents the impact of the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English news on the foreign share discount. 
  
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression  
(5) 
RGB_NEWS 0.0076** 0.0101*** 0.0074** 0.0101*** 0.0074** 
 (2.01) (2.66) (2.249) (2.649) (2.195) 
RelativeMV  0.6137*** 0.497* 0.614** 0.496* 
   (2.56) (1.940) (2.558) (1.928) 
RelativeTO  0.0921*** 0.0734*** 0.0922*** 0.0737*** 
   (5.08) (4.384) (5.072) (4.382) 
StateControl  0.0395** 0.0350** 0.0395** 0.0350** 
   (2.42) (2.240) (2.417) (2.231) 
Reform  ‒0.0388*** -0.110*** -0.0389*** -0.111*** 
   (‒3.59) (-10.07) (-3.588) (-10.16) 
RelativeRET  0.0003 0.000114 0.000284 0.000131 
   (1.28) (0.523) (1.281) (0.594) 
Beta  ‒0.0081 0.0268* -0.00812 0.0267* 
    (‒0.53) (1.678) (-0.530) (1.668) 
FSI  ‒0.0065* -0.000419 -0.00647* -0.000464 
    (‒1.74) (-0.224) (-1.732) (-0.250) 
ROA  ‒0.3839 -0.471* -0.384 -0.473* 
    (‒1.43) (-1.858) (-1.429) (-1.852) 
∆SalesGrowth  0.0052* 0.00396 0.00520 0.00386 
   (1.64) (1.273) (1.629) (1.232) 
TobinQ  ‒0.0402* -0.00203 -0.0402* -0.00204 
    (‒1.70) (-0.0969) (-1.697) (-0.0968) 
Leverage  0.1288* 0.0741 0.129* 0.0738 
   (1.73) (1.173) (1.733) (1.165) 
OwnershipC  0.0745 0.137** 0.0743 0.138** 
   (0.59) (2.182) (0.590) (2.183) 
CHOLD  ‒0.0185 -0.0139 -0.0185 -0.0140 
   (‒0.79) (-0.666) (-0.789) (-0.667) 
CDUAL  ‒0.0295 -0.0137 -0.0295 -0.0135 
   (‒1.01) (-0.458) (-1.010) (-0.453) 
BINDP  0.0145 0.0177 0.0144 0.0180 
   (0.77) (1.113) (0.770) (1.122) 
BSIZE  ‒0.0283 -0.0128 -0.0282 -0.0130 
   (‒1.27) (-0.600) (-1.268) (-0.607) 
BMEET  ‒0.0109 -0.00233 -0.0109 -0.00230 
   (‒0.94) (-0.207) (-0.943) (-0.203) 
constant 0.3913*** ‒0.4123 -0.170 -0.412 -0.166 
  (45.42)  (‒1.52) (-0.572) (-1.516) (-0.559) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0357 0.0333 0.1241 0.0333 0.1260 
Obs.  4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
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Table 3. Chinese language good and bad news vs English language good and bad news 
 
This table presents the impact of the number of Chinese and English news reports on the foreign share discount. 
  
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
Regression 
(6) 
Regression 
(7) 
CGNEWS 0.0079* 0.0085*** 0.0071* 0.0074*** 0.00654* 0.00852** 0.00643 
 (1.79) (3.16) (1.85) (2.71) (1.691) (2.031) (1.654) 
EBNEWS 0.389 0.742 0.533 0.223 0.168 0.342 0.184 
 (0.78) (1.24) (1.54) (0.35) (0.462) (0.606) (0.497) 
CGNEWS*EBNEWS    2.035** 1.460* 2.009* 1.478* 
    (2.32) (1.760) (1.886) (1.803) 
RelativeMV  0.419*** 0.478* 0.419*** 0.499* 0.615** 0.498* 
  (6.90) (1.86) (6.90) (1.955) (2.574) (1.942) 
RelativeTO  0.0912*** 0.0739*** 0.0910*** 0.0734*** 0.0921*** 0.0736*** 
  (12.97) (4.43) (12.95) (4.379) (5.062) (4.378) 
StateControl  0.0367*** 0.0349** 0.0365*** 0.0346** 0.0389** 0.0346** 
  (5.12) (2.23) (5.08) (2.214) (2.398) (2.204) 
Reform  -0.0373*** -0.110*** -0.0373*** -0.110*** -0.0390*** -0.111*** 
  (-10.20) (-10.15) (-10.20) (-10.09) (-3.615) (-10.19) 
RelativeRET  0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.000119 0.000290 0.000137 
  (1.09) (0.49) (1.11) (0.544) (1.303) (0.618) 
Beta  -0.0086 0.0291* -0.0089 0.0266* -0.00835 0.0265 
  (-1.56) (1.77) (-1.61) (1.668) (-0.546) (1.658) 
FSI  -0.0068*** -0.0005 -0.0069*** -0.000437 -0.00647* -0.000482 
  (-8.01) (-0.26) (-8.03) (-0.233) (-1.729) (-0.258) 
ROA  -0.421*** -0.424* -0.420*** -0.469* -0.381 -0.471* 
  (-3.72) (-1.66) (-3.77) (-1.851) (-1.422) (-1.846) 
∆SalesGrowth  0.0049*** 0.0037 0.0049*** 0.00396 0.00520 0.00387 
  (3.32) (1.19) (3.32) (1.273) (1.629) (1.231) 
TobinQ  -0.0410*** -0.0001 -0.0414*** -0.00198 -0.0402* -0.00201 
  (-4.64) (-0.0033) (-4.69) (-0.0948) (-1.699) (-0.0956) 
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Leverage  0.128*** 0.0704 0.128*** 0.0746 0.129* 0.0743 
  (6.44) (1.11) (6.47) (1.183) (1.747) (1.176) 
OwnershipC  0.0807** 0.135** 0.0830** 0.135** 0.0715 0.136** 
  (2.33) (2.14) (2.40) (2.159) (0.569) (2.162) 
CHOLD  -0.0198*** -0.0143 -0.0194*** -0.0138 -0.0184 -0.0139 
  (-2.79) (-0.69) (-2.74) (-0.660) (-0.783) (-0.662) 
CDUAL  -0.0281** -0.0142 -0.0282** -0.0138 -0.0298 -0.0138 
  (-2.19) (-0.48) (-2.20) (-0.462) (-1.014) (-0.458) 
BINDP  0.0159** 0.0141 0.0161** 0.0176 0.0143 0.0179 
  (2.20) (0.88) (2.22) (1.105) (0.766) (1.115) 
BSIZE  -0.0310*** -0.0107 -0.0314*** -0.0129 -0.0283 -0.0131 
  (-4.97) (-0.50) (-5.04) (-0.604) (-1.273) (-0.610) 
BMEET  -0.0093** -0.0030 -0.0093** -0.00232 -0.0109 -0.00229 
  (-2.34) (-0.27) (-2.34) (-0.206) (-0.943) (-0.202) 
constant 0.493*** -0.188*** -0.160 -0.188*** -0.172 -0.412 -0.167 
 (73.16) (-2.69) (-0.54) (-2.68) (-0.579) (-1.521) (-0.565) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0526 0.0527 0.11316 0.0533 0.1242 0.0322 0.1224 
Obs.  4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A.  
t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 4. Correlation of SVI with good news, bad news and analyst following 
 
Panels A and B present the correlations of the average (median) attention from local (foreign) investors with Chinese (English) language good and bad news. 
Chinese (English) SVI is a proxy of local (foreign) investor attention. Panel C presents the correlations of the average (median) attention with the number of 
analysts following. 
 
    Panel A   Correlation of SVI with Chinese language good and bad news 
Dep. Var. Chinese Sum SVI Chinese Avg. SVI Chinese Med. SVI 
CGNEWS 0.1739***  0.0401***  0.0396***  
 (4.96)  (5.09)  (5.06)  
CBNEWS  0.1997  0.0472  0.0438 
  (1.13)  (1.15)  (1.09) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0108 0.0100 0.0110 0.0100 0.0106 0.0100 
Obs.  4,237 4,237 4,237 4,237 4,237 4,237 
    Panel B   Correlation of SVI with English language good and bad news 
Dep. Var. English Sum SVI English Avg. SVI English Med. SVI 
EGNEWS 0.7985  0.0933  0.2556  
 (0.809)  (0.13)  (0.31)  
EBNEWS  20.7203***  4.2445**  4.1698** 
  (2.72)  (2.70)  (2.61) 
Firm fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0140 0.0101 0.0131 0.0100 0.0136 0.0100 
Obs.  1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 1,226 
                     Panel C   Correlation of SVI with number of analysts following 
Dep. Var. Total Sum SVI  
(Chinese and English) 
 Total Avg. SVI 
(Chinese and English) 
 Total Med. SVI  
(Chinese and English) 
 
Analyst following 0.6329**  0.1460**  0.1446**  
 (2.37)  (2.35)  (2. 34)  
Firm fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes  Yes  Yes  
R-squared 0.0377  0.0381  0.0378  
Obs.  1,064  1,064  1,064  
 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A.  t-
statistics are in parentheses.  
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Table 5. Information asymmetry and foreign share discount 
 
This table presents the impact of information asymmetry on the relationship between the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to 
English news and the foreign share discount for a firm. In Regressions (1) and (2), we use analyst following to proxy for 
information asymmetry. In Regressions (3) and (4), we use analyst forecast dispersion to proxy for information asymmetry. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression (1)   Regression (2)  Regression (3) Regression (4) 
Low following High following   High forecast dispersion Low forecast dispersion 
      
RGB_NEWS 0.00167 0.00637*  0.00187 0.00980* 
 (0.286) (1.823)  (0.262) (2.052) 
RelativeMV 0.418 0.570*  1.393*** 1.632*** 
 (1.036) (1.993)  (3.752) (3.483) 
RelativeTO 0.0825*** 0.0632***  -0.0502 -0.120 
 (3.630) (2.863)  (-1.086) (-1.162) 
StateControl 0.0120 0.0518**  -0.0711 -0.0410 
 (0.567) (2.491)  (-0.964) (-1.208) 
Reform -0.105*** -0.113***  0.0224 0.0571 
 (-7.634) (-4.933)  (0.548) (0.695) 
RelativeRET 0.000125 0.000255  0.00186 -0.00273* 
 (0.439) (0.702)  (1.299) (-2.004) 
Beta 0.0217 0.00967  -0.0838 0.0449 
 (1.468) (0.292)  (-0.863) (0.869) 
FSI -0.000389 -0.00103  0.00463 -0.00989 
 (-0.169) (-0.406)  (0.532) (-1.452) 
ROA -0.247 -0.629  -6.959*** -3.112** 
 (-1.058) (-1.011)  (-4.854) (-2.807) 
∆SalesGrowth 0.00108 0.00536  0.0470 0.0825 
 (0.227) (1.482)  (1.688) (1.649) 
TobinQ 0.0197 -0.0716*  -0.0851 0.0751 
 (0.884) (-1.707)  (-1.037) (0.769) 
Leverage 0.0347 0.122  -0.861*** -0.0699 
 (0.545) (1.286)  (-3.163) (-0.370) 
OwnershipC 0.126* 0.0718  0.698 0.669 
 (1.946) (0.243)  (0.876) (1.486) 
CHOLD -0.0121 -0.0215  0.0352 0.0833*** 
 (-0.344) (-0.832)  (0.678) (3.501) 
CDUAL -0.0446 0.00983  -0.0199 0.212*** 
 (-1.182) (0.313)  (-0.701) (4.207) 
BINDP -0.0218 0.0773***  -0.149*** -0.166** 
 (-1.101) (3.147)  (-4.426) (-2.411) 
BSIZE 0.0337 -0.0632**  0.0375 0.0424 
 (1.185) (-2.555)  (1.043) (0.733) 
BMEET -0.00178 -0.0164  0.0292 0.0497* 
 (-0.125) (-1.016)  (0.921) (1.770) 
Constant -0.0674 -0.193  -0.371 -1.364** 
 (-0.148) (-0.566)  (-0.786) (-2.106) 
Firm fixed effects Yes   Yes   Yes   Yes  
Year fixed effects Yes Yes  Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0236 0.2253  0.2357 0.1388 
Obs. 2,224 1,994  2,091 2,127 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. The 
variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 6. Regression results based on change-in-change 
 
This table presents the impact of the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English news on the foreign 
share discount. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
      
RGB_NEWS 0.0097*** 0.0100*** 0.0097*** 0.0100*** 0.0096*** 
 (3.88) (4.06) (3.98) (4.06) (3.86) 
RelativeMV  0.0025 -0.0038 0.0190 -0.0047 
  (0.34) (-0.09) (0.54) (-0.12) 
RelativeTO  0.0552*** 0.0565*** 0.0555*** 0.0563*** 
  (4.86) (4.91) (4.86) (4.96) 
StateControl  -0.0006 -0.0025 0.0001 -0.0024 
  (-0.35) (-0.76) (0.03) (-0.69) 
Reform  -0.0102*** -0.0417*** -0.0126*** -0.0414*** 
  (-4.63) (-4.87) (-4.44) (-4.81) 
RelativeRET  0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 0.0001 
  (0.66) (0.67) (0.66) (0.64) 
Beta  -0.0007 0.0021 -0.0016 0.0025 
  (-0.36) (0.79) (-0.67) (0.91) 
FSI  -0.0002 0.0004 0.0000 0.0004 
  (-0.53) (1.08) (0.05) (1.00) 
ROA  0.0053 -0.0327 0.0066 -0.0318 
  (0.15) (-0.60) (0.15) (-0.56) 
∆SalesGrowth  -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0003 0.0001 
  (-0.64) (0.38) (-0.52) (0.26) 
TobinQ  -0.0063* -0.0015 -0.0093** -0.0024 
  (-1.91) (-0.34) (-2.40) (-0.50) 
Leverage  0.0000 0.0024 0.0265*** 0.0019 
  (0.00) (0.18) (2.81) (0.14) 
OwnershipC  -0.0021 -0.0266* -0.0399** -0.0272* 
  (-0.43) (-1.90) (-2.47) (-1.94) 
CHOLD  0.0019 -0.0001 0.0015 0.0003 
  (1.23) (-0.03) (0.34) (0.06) 
CDUAL  -0.0086 -0.0089 -0.0144** -0.0088 
  (-1.60) (-1.54) (-2.35) (-1.50) 
BINDP  -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0041 -0.0007 
  (-0.85) (-0.13) (-1.35) (-0.21) 
BSIZE  -0.0019 0.0028 -0.0013 0.0027 
  (-1.18) (0.83) (-0.38) (0.76) 
BMEET  0.0018 0.0022 0.0012 0.0022 
  (1.31) (1.06) (0.61) (1.04) 
Constant 0.0011 0.0075 0.0454 -0.0139 0.0434 
 (1.17) (0.82) (0.95) (-0.35) (0.92) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0067 0.0313 0.0320 0.0250 0.0435 
Obs. 3,432 3,432 3,432 3,432 3,432 
 
*, ** and*** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under 
two-tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 7. Regression results based on PSM 
 
This table presents the robustness test on the impact of the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English 
news on the foreign share discount. We use a nearest-neighbor propensity score matching based on 
year, month, industry, region, firm and board characteristics. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression 
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression 
(5) 
      
RGB_NEWS 0.0103*** 0.0089** 0.0073** 0.0099** 0.0077** 
 (2.90) (2.30) (2.23) (2.52) (2.30) 
RelativeMV  0.1168 0.2675 0.3611 0.2798 
  (0.63) (0.93) (1.20) (0.99) 
RelativeTO  0.0774*** 0.0664*** 0.0800*** 0.0682*** 
  (2.88) (2.95) (3.01) (2.99) 
StateControl  0.0213 0.0298* 0.0278 0.0280 
  (1.32) (1.70) (1.49) (1.58) 
Reform  -0.0253** -0.1127*** -0.0266** -0.1140*** 
  (-2.12) (-7.93) (-2.13) (-7.65) 
RelativeRET  0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0002 
  (0.66) (0.38) (0.76) (0.51) 
Beta  -0.0142 0.0330 -0.0157 0.0331 
  (-0.70) (1.40) (-0.72) (1.40) 
FSI  -0.0154*** -0.0030 -0.0145*** -0.0029 
  (-4.46) (-1.19) (-4.27) (-1.16) 
ROA  -0.7522 -0.7692* -0.6151 -0.7729* 
  (-1.46) (-1.70) (-1.11) (-1.73) 
∆SalesGrowth  0.0070*** 0.0071*** 0.0078*** 0.0065*** 
  (3.25) (2.79) (3.31) (2.89) 
TobinQ  -0.0507* 0.0068 -0.0474 0.0072 
  (-1.72) (0.26) (-1.60) (0.27) 
Leverage  0.1397*** 0.0212 0.1516 0.0205 
  (2.82) (0.24) (1.66) (0.23) 
OwnershipC  -0.0493 0.0120 -0.1040 0.0280 
  (-0.39) (0.13) (-0.49) (0.31) 
CHOLD  -0.0248 -0.0068 -0.0183 -0.0094 
  (-1.12) (-0.35) (-0.70) (-0.49) 
CDUAL  -0.0340 0.0038 -0.0357 0.0057 
  (-1.59) (0.18) (-1.61) (0.27) 
BINDP  0.0286 0.0127 0.0210 0.0114 
  (0.85) (0.53) (0.62) (0.47) 
BSIZE  -0.0543** -0.0277 -0.0505* -0.0277 
  (-2.15) (-1.04) (-1.78) (-1.05) 
BMEET  -0.0181 -0.0068 -0.0200 -0.0047 
  (-1.28) (-0.53) (-1.36) (-0.37) 
Constant 0.4737*** 0.2037 0.1278 -0.1029 0.1189 
 (72.48) (0.96) (0.39) (-0.30) (0.37) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.1283 0.0797 0.2072 0.0379 0.2152 
Obs. 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 1,756 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-
tailed tests. The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses. 
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Table 8.                    Regression results based on the use of the natural log of  
                                       the dependent and the main independent variable 
 
This table presents the impact of the ratio of favouritism in Chinese to English news on the foreign share discount, 
using the natural log of ForeignDiscount as the dependent variable and the natural log of RGB_NEWS as the main 
independent variable. 
 
Dep. Var.= 
Ln_ForeignDiscount 
Regression 
(1) 
Regression 
(2) 
Regression  
(3) 
Regression 
(4) 
Regression  
(5) 
      
Ln_RGB_NEWS 0.0106** 0.0081* 0.0073* 0.0080* 0.0073* 
 (2.37) (1.91) (1.74) (1.90) (1.73) 
RelativeMV  0.6247 1.1371 0.6436 1.1338 
  (0.98) (1.29) (0.99) (1.28) 
RelativeTO  0.2078*** 0.2155*** 0.2089*** 0.2161*** 
  (4.23) (4.36) (4.25) (4.37) 
StateControl  0.0908** 0.0954** 0.0909** 0.0953** 
  (2.52) (2.57) (2.53) (2.56) 
Reform  -0.0719** -0.0769** -0.0722** -0.0771** 
  (-2.26) (-2.32) (-2.27) (-2.32) 
RelativeRET  0.0014 0.0015 0.0014 0.0015 
  (1.25) (1.29) (1.25) (1.28) 
Beta  -0.0018 -0.0028 -0.0021 -0.0029 
  (-0.04) (-0.06) (-0.05) (-0.06) 
FSI  -0.0144 -0.0133 -0.0144 -0.0133 
  (-1.02) (-0.95) (-1.01) (-0.95) 
ROA  -1.3932** -1.2287* -1.3864** -1.2315* 
  (-2.07) (-1.92) (-2.06) (-1.92) 
∆SalesGrowth  0.0120* 0.0126* 0.0120* 0.0126* 
  (1.75) (1.81) (1.75) (1.80) 
TobinQ  -0.1007 -0.0982 -0.0999 -0.0976 
  (-1.49) (-1.46) (-1.47) (-1.45) 
Leverage  0.3624** 0.4023** 0.3637** 0.4019** 
  (2.38) (2.00) (2.36) (2.00) 
OwnershipC  0.1570 0.1064 0.1537 0.1050 
  (0.46) (0.25) (0.44) (0.24) 
CHOLD  -0.1123* -0.1100 -0.1120* -0.1098 
  (-1.73) (-1.63) (-1.72) (-1.62) 
CDUAL  -0.0794 -0.0885 -0.0797 -0.0883 
  (-0.97) (-1.06) (-0.98) (-1.06) 
BINDP  0.0876 0.0814 0.0868 0.0809 
  (1.43) (1.34) (1.42) (1.33) 
BSIZE  -0.1483** -0.1397* -0.1476** -0.1393* 
  (-1.98) (-1.80) (-1.97) (-1.79) 
BMEET  -0.0306 -0.0363 -0.0313 -0.0367 
  (-0.81) (-0.94) (-0.83) (-0.96) 
constant -0.9219*** -1.9959*** -2.6012** -2.0240*** -2.6033** 
 (-367.35) (-2.80) (-2.61) (-2.81) (-2.61) 
Firm fixed effects Yes No Yes Yes Yes 
Year fixed effects Yes No Yes No Yes 
Month fixed effects No No No Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.0167 0.0656 0.0429 0.0648 0.0432 
Obs.  4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 4,218 
 
*, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively, under two-tailed tests. 
The variables are defined in Appendix A. t-statistics are in parentheses.  
 
  
Highlights 
 
• There is a long-standing foreign share discount puzzle in China 
• Government censors negative news and stresses positive news of Chinese media 
• The ratio of positive to negative news is substantially higher for Chinese than English 
newspapers 
• Such favoritism is found to inflate the price of domestic A-shares 
• The news perception distorted by media censorship helps to explain the puzzle 
	
